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THE DANGERS OF "INVESTOR PROTECTION" IN
SECURITIES MARKETS
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*
I. INTRODUCTION: TROUBLESOME TIMES
The purpose of this short Article is to step back a bit from the
current controversies to ask this question: What is the proper
way to understand the impact of domestic regulation on
international securities markets? Any proper analysis has to call
into question the basic structure of securities regulation. It must
also deal with recent innovations such as Sarbanes-Oxley.
This analysis does not take place in a vacuum. It is instead yet
another act in the long-term clash between two worldviews. The
first is that of individuals who hold a general classical liberal
orientation. That approach sets its initial presumption to fear,
not welcome, government regulation of financial markets on the
simple ground that private incentives for profit and gain will do
a better job of ferreting out fraud and other forms of
misconduct than schemes of government regulation that require
expensive standard measures-e.g. registration statements-to
supply prophylactic responses to fraud. On the other side of this
divide lie individuals who think that actors in private markets are
much more limited in their ability to detect and to contain
fraud. On this view, extensive forms of regulation, including
command and control mechanisms, are needed even for
transactions that involve only sophisticated parties, and even
more so, in order to protect the small investor from various
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Chicago; The Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution. A.B.
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1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
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forms of abuse. To be sure, within this arena, we need not enter
the larger debate over whether we should welcome private
capital markets at all. The only question is the nature and extent
of the regulation needed to combat fraud and other sharp
practices.
Many of these major regulatory schemes must be rethought
with the rise of global markets, which surely changes the mix of
sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. If any antifraud
system of regulation makes sense, then we should expect to draw
foreign capital and investors into the United States, for
sophisticated investors around the globe crave confidence in the
probity of capital markets. But if that assumption on extensive,
or new, levels of regulation turns out to be wrong, foreign
investors should reduce their position in the United States in
light of the dislocation that regulation creates. The direction of
capital flows should give strong indication as to the net benefit of
the package of legislation, even if it will not allow us to decide
which particular reforms or practices are desirable and which
not.
To set the stage, let me first deal with some of the common
misconceptions of regulation, of which it is possible to identify
four. The first deals with the unstated depreciation rates of
regulation. The second addresses the supposedly inelastic
response to regulation. The third deals with the
underapprecation of future regulation. The fourth deals with
the indirect consequences of regulation. Once this is done, I
shall talk about the legal upshot in both administrative and
constitutional law that follows from these wrong conceptions:
strong deference to government actors, which accelerates the
rate of direct regulation, and with it the level of capital flight
from the domestic public securities market. Next, I shall
evaluate how this framework applies in two concrete situations:
the basic design of the securities acts, and the rise of the
independent director. The last section then explains why the
cumulative impact of these reforms has been to reduce the
attractiveness of United States securities markets on the world
stage.
Vol. 12
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II. COMMON MISTAKES ON REGULATION
A. Regulatory Depreciation
The first of the pitfalls associated with regulatory interventions
is that of hidden depreciation. Regulation, especially good
regulation, should be thought of as a kind of social asset. Its
value is determined like that of any other asset. What is the value
of the system when it is first put into place? And what is its rate
of depreciation (or, occasionally, appreciation) over time?
There are some statutes, which have high initial values and low,
even nonexistent rates of depreciation. My favorite example is
the Statute of Frauds, circa 1677,2 which retains its value with
real estate transactions to the present day. The reason for this
impressive durability is that the statute only requires certain
simple formalities-written instruments signed by the party to
be charged-whose value increases as underlying deals become
more valuable and more complex. Stated otherwise, the Statute
of Frauds retains its power because it offers a simple set of
intuitive precautions that facilitate, not frustrate, voluntary
transactions. Other regulatory schemes of course have more
interventionist ambitions, and these are more likely to
depreciate at a very high rate. Unfortunately, regulation, unlike
market behaviors, does not have the key advantage of
decentralized self-correction. To give but one example, the
recent Telecommunications Act of 19963 was predicated on the
assumption that land-based telephones would remain dominant,
so that regulation of local exchange carriers was the key to
breaking down their "last mile" advantage. Sorry. The
improvement in cell phones, the rise of VOIP telephony and a
thousand other innovations, large and small, have rendered that
framework obsolete. Today landlines are shrinking both in
absolute numbers and as a percentage of total service. Yet twelve
years later, there is no assurance that the Congress will pass the
next generation of regulatory controls, given the new interest
groups that have emerged. Securities regulation is not immune
from the same rate of depreciation, given the vast technological
transformation of trading technologies.
2. Statute of Frauds, 1677, 29 Car. II., c. 3.
3. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-404, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
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B. Inelastic Private Responses to Regulation
A second mistake often made by modern defenders of
regulation is to assume that most private markets are marked by
an enormous amount of firm inelasticity; there is, in other
words, relatively little private response to government
regulation. Here is one domestic example. A typical defense of
the minimum wage runs as follows: if one paid workers seven
dollars an hour, and if one raises it to nine dollars an hour, one
pays workers an extra two dollars an hour. The total wage bill is
a simple exercise in mathematics. If there were 100 workers
before the wage increase, there would be 100 workers after it, so
that the total wage bill would increase by $200, leaving
everything else unchanged. Few people will utter the
proposition in this mathematical form, but it is implicit any
account that insists that minimum wages "help" or "protect" all
workers. Accordingly, the conscientious regulator need not
worry about whether employers are going to reduce the number
of employed workers in response to the mandated wage
increase.
In so doing, however, they make the fatal mistake of assuming
that small (or even not so small) changes in regulation have no
effect on private decisions. One way to put this point is to ask
the question of whether there would be any change in
employment levels if the minimum wage level were set a single
penny above the prevailing market wage. The obvious response
is, who would fire a worker to save a cent? But what about the
second cent and the third? That said, it does seem clear that the
$2.00 raise will have some consequences, even though it is
simply the sum of 200 penny increases. If so, then the question
arises: how can the totality of these increases matter, when each
component of them does not? And to that challenge there is
really no reply.
The key point to extract from this example is that, as the price
increases, the quantity demanded goes down. Any demand
function is continuous and monotonically declining, even if it is
not linear. Each increase in prices, whether required or
voluntary, will produce a decrease in demand. It does not follow,
however, that for infinitesimal increases in price, there will be an
observed decrease in quantity. All that can be said with complete
confidence is that there is always a positive probability, even one
that is tiny, that any price increase will produce that associated
Vol. 12
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quantity reduction. As the intervals get larger, the results
become inexorable. And we know from politics that no one will
invest the political capital to make infinitesimal changes. We
should therefore in all real-world settings observe the changes in
supply. And the same arguments apply to changes in the
quantities supplied as a function of price. There are no "safe"
intervals where regulation can operate to provide protection in
one dimension-e.g. price-without generating risks in
another-e.g. quantity. And what happens for monetary changes
applies with equal force to regulatory burdens that always cash
out to some monetary equivalent. The only questions therefore
to worry about are the extent of the changes, never their
existence.
Therefore, the naive regulator who starts with the initial
assumption of an inelastic response is always going to opt for
more extensive systems of regulation than will prove in practice
to be sustainable in the long run. In contrast, anyone who starts
from the opposite assumption-namely, that individuals and
firms are always on a slope, and never on flat terrain-will be
more cautious in designing regulatory schemes because of the
abiding fear that regulated parties will respond in ways that
undermine the regulatory objectives. The quantity demanded of
anything goes down as the price goes up-regulation included.
At this point the arguments play out just as they did with the
minimum wage. Magnitudes matter in regulation. Modest
regulations will not generate much of a difference. Extensive
schemes will. Beware of any argument that says a small change
just makes "no difference."
C. Anticipated Additional Regulation
A third caveat also applies with special force to new regimes of
taxation and regulation. The impact of a modest regulation
must be thought of not only in a static, but also in a dynamic
sense. A new small tax or regulation will generate a modest
response only if the regulated parties are confident that the
severity of the tax or regulation will not increase with time. But
in a world with few binding constitutional protections against
regulation or taxation, that simplifying assumption is likely to
prove wrong. In particular, regulated parties that have to make
front-end investments lasting several years are always afraid of
the camel that gets his nose inside of the tent. Before the onset
No. 2
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of the new regulation, the regulatory environment looked
constant. But once the new regulation is in place, then the
political dynamics change. To get the regulation through,
regulators will assure people that conscientious regulators will
keep it mild so that there is nothing to fear. No firm guarantees,
of course.
Stage two can quickly follow. Once the regulation is in place,
the argument then switches. The earlier promises of restraint
are forgotten. Or it is said that changed circumstances requires
more aggressive intervention. At the same time, the initial
approval of the regulation is said to put to rest all doubts as to its
wisdom in principle, or when relevant, to its constitutionality.
The only question is the matter of severity or degree, or the very
type of decision that has to be left to political, not judicial
bodies. The upshot is that the initial round of regulation (or
taxation) is used to establish the program, after which increases
are easier to come by. The political strategy is to get to a high-
regulation or high-taxation regime in two stages rather than
one. And if regulated (or taxed) parties perceive that this two-
step will take place, their response in the initial period will
reflect their anxiety of future government action. In dealing
with regulation, therefore, the disputes will be telescoped. The
resistance to the initial regulation (like its support) will reflect
the discounted probability of more exacting amendments, just
as it would for the (less likely) prospect of repeal. The battle will
be more intense than one might suppose and so too the
magnitude of its effect. There are no secrets in a world in which
a second wave of regulation can follow the first. The regulator
who misses these tendencies, and therefore assumes that
regulated parties have short time horizons, will systematically
underestimate the rate at which capital moves across
jurisdictional boundaries, both within the United States and
internationally.
D. Direct and Indirect Consequences
A fourth common mistake of regulators is to assume that the
indirect consequences of regulation are small and can therefore
be safely ignored. If, however, what I contend with respect to
elastic responses to regulation is correct, then indirect
consequences are likely to undermine the efforts of regulators to
confine the private responses to some narrow domain. Here the
Vol. 12
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simple observation is this: regulation will surely influence the
supply and demand of the regulated goods and services. But in
addition, it will exert a powerful influence over the supply and
demand of all the complements to and all the substitutes for the
regulated goods or activities. These cascade effects will add up
very quickly, carrying with them the potential to set up
alternative business regimes that are beyond regulation. Or
alternatively, where the substitutions are difficult to arrange, the
regulations could cripple those activities that are heavily
dependent of the vitality of the regulated sector. Drive financial
activities out of the United States, and the large investment
banks may follow their clients overseas. But many local
employees and real estate owners will have fewer options, and
will therefore be caught in a heavy downdraft.
The reason for these diverse responses is not hard to see.
Think of the current system as one that is in relative
equilibrium. The question now is what adaptive responses will
take place if a regulator adds one (or more) powerful constraint
onto the system. The simple truth is that the tighter the
constraint the more extensive the disruptions for the regulated
parties and for those who do business with them. Any stress on
these indirect consequences helps legitimate a regime of laissez-
faire. All too often the regulators listen to those people who
claim that they should receive special protection because of the
dislocation that comes from market forces, often generated by
persons who have less political clout than they do. The dozen
victims of market innovations are easy to see when they are let
go from bankrupt firms. The hundred winners from the new
innovations that may never take place cannot come forward to
defend their interests in person before political bodies. The
visible persons hurt by ruinous competition can easily wring
special concessions from legislators that slow down the
technological or business shifts or give some special
compensation packages to those who are displaced by them.
Taking into account only the position of the visible losers-e.g.,
those displaced by mortgage foreclosure-gives a systematically
misleading account of what should be done. This response
could in the end negatively influence the willingness of foreign
investors to place their capital in American markets. All too
often, the unwillingness, or inability, to take into account these
indirect effects leads to systematic overregulation.
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III. PAYING THE PIPER: DEFERENCE TO THE "GOOD FAITH"
REGULATOR
The four mistakes that I have just outlined have important
consequences for the shape of American law, as it operates in
both the domestic and international arenas. In a world in which
the pitfalls of regulation are constantly understated, it is easy to
defend the general proposition that regulators who act in good
faith should be given the benefit of the doubt. That simple
proposition manifests itself in countless ways in our current legal
system. At the constitutional level, it tends to neuter all
challenges to regulation based on the traditional ground that
they interfere unduly with liberty and property. In the end,
therefore, federal and state regulators have carte blanche to
decide whether the interference is justified. At the
administrative law level, it can easily lead to a form of extreme
deference to administrative agencies, now embodied in Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc.,4 on the
grounds that their supposed expertise and neutrality should not
be attacked by courts that cannot hope to understand the
complexity of the underlying issues.
This one-two punch has had a powerful influence on
American law, so much so that it is virtually impossible to mount
a successful challenge to any major regulatory scheme no matter
how perverse and anticompetitive its effects. The same courts
that often do a good job figuring out which business practices
are anticompetitive under the antitrust laws are now wholly
unable to bring the same analytical tools to bear on various
forms of administrative regulation. Most judges are now aware of
the anticompetitive effects of any antitrust decisions that are
justified on the ground that they restrict predatory practices.5
But let them don their constitutional hats, and they are unable
to find themselves unable, or unwilling, to mount any attack on
4. Cheron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(deciding that where a statute is unclear, courts should defer to the agency' s permissible
construction of the statute).
5. See, e.g., Weyerhaetser Co. v. Ross-Simmons, 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007); Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
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grotesque systems of cartelization that characterize so much
legislative activity.6
In adopting this deferential stance, modern constitutional law
turns the great insight of Frederic Bastiat on its head. Bastiat
thought of government as a device that lets each person put his
hand into the pocket of his neighbor.7 That happens all too
often, but in fact one, perhaps "the," reason people need
government is that the mutual renunciation of private force,
which cannot be achieved by voluntary agreement alone, creates
genuine Pareto improvements," even after taking into account
the taxes that are needed to make this regulation function.
Given the evident existence of at least some Pareto
improvements, the task of the regulator is to figure out whether
or not their new legal regime has created a rising tide for all
ships or whether or not that regime has simply shifted the ballast
from one side of the ship to the other. Too much tilt and the
ship is in danger of capsizing, which could lead to some
adjustments to reestablish a preferred balance.
The twin assumptions of rational basis constitutional law and
Chevron deference administrative law now take on a more
ominous interpretation. The passionate defenders of big
government have made the (undeserved) presumption of good
faith well nigh irrefutable. Courts are all too willing to assume
that regulation raises all ships equally, or alternatively, it does
not matter whether it does or not. But there is an unfortunate
feedback loop between the level of judicial review and the
quality of the regulation. The less courts scrutinize the way in
which regulation takes place, the more likely it is that the
legislature will pass faction-ridden regulation. While the cat is
away, the mice will play.
IV. SECURITIES REGULATION AND SARBANES-OXLEY
How then do these difficulties play out in connection with the
present regulation of securities markets? Here let me make only
6. See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (establishing that restraint of trade
or monopolization resulting from valid governmental action, as opposed to private
action, does not violate the Sherman Act).
7. FREDERIC BASTIAT, The State, in SELECTED ESSAYs ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 140, 144
(1964) ("The state is the great fictitious entity by which everyone seeks to live at the
expense of everyone else.").
8. A Pareto improvement is an improvement to one aspect of a system that does not
harm any other aspect.
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two points. The first concerns the rate of depreciation of old
regulation and the second concerns the dangers associated with
regulatory innovation.
A. Down with the Small Investor!
On the first issue, begin with this heretical question: why do
we need the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) anyway?
Essentially, in 1932 the market had a large number of small
individual traders, and there was the real question about
whether or not they could be bilked or cheated with wash sales
and lots of other market manipulations to which direct
regulation could provide a helpful antidote. 9 But let us assume
that the system made sense when first introduced. Is there any
reason to think that it is not completely obsolete today? I put
aside here such ridiculous and outdated practices of sending
various proxies and reports through the mails, to talk about the
more fundamental question of when regulation works and when
it does not.
The key premise is this: no unitary system of regulation works
well with respect to heterogeneous communities and trading.
Stated otherwise, the larger the variation in the regulated
population, the less effective is any resort to one-size-fits-all
models. The point surely applies to capital markets in which all
may participate. There are, beyond doubt, dolts on the one
hand and whizzes on the other. One cannot create a uniform set
of rules that works for everybody, and the only way one can stop
this is basically to adopt a new policy that sharply reduces the
mandate of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The small
investor be damned, to paraphrase Mr. Vanderbilt. ' Updated
and sanitized, what that proposition says to members of the
unwashed public is that they should let others invest on their
behalf, be it through a mutual fund, a financial representative,
or any other cooperative that they might choose to join.
Knowing that these options are available in abundance, the SEC
will craft its rules not for slowpokes but only for speed demons
9. See, e.g., Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-65, 48 Stat. 162; Jonathan Z. Cohen,
Comment, The M~ellon Bank Order: An Unjustifiable Expansion of Banking Powers, 8 ADMIN.
L.J. AM. U., 335, 335 (1994) (criticizing the expansion of regulations implemented in
response to the Great Depression).
10. Michael Binyon, The Right Kind of Lines on the Track, THE TIMES (London), May
27, 2006, at 12.
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because anyone can hire a speed demon. At that particular
point, all professional players-the Fidelitys and the Smith
Barneys-can be subject to an explicit array of fiduciary
obligations that by contract protect investors from various forms
of abuse. Once this is done, the SEC operates on principles akin
to NASCAR insofar as it superintends only professional drivers.
Uniform ability allows for higher speeds, in driving and
exchange transactions. A fundamental reorientation of the
whole SEC is manifestly in order.
B. Independent Directors
The errors in institutional design deal not only with the large
questions, but also smaller, but still critical, issues. One of the
buzz words of the past decade or so has been the claim that a
sound Board of Directors requires a large dose of independent
directors." But what is the source of this claim? Once again all
boards are not the same, so that the only theoretical prediction
that we can make is this: different boards require different mixes
of inside and outside directors. The "right" answer in any case
will depend on a full array of factors. What are the core
competences of current members of the corporate
management? How many outsiders are available? What sorts of
challenges face the corporation, and so on? So sometimes they
are and sometimes they are not. Or more accurately, in some
cases, more or fewer outside directors could be called for. The
hard challenge for regulation asks this question: what
information does Congress or the SEC, or indeed any
specialized body, have about the proper mix for a particular
firm? The fact that we see variation in responses does not mean
that some firms lag behind another. It is just more proof of the
risks in following any one-size-fits-all approach. Let those who
bear the consequences of any mistakes make the choices.
Unfortunately, the current regime pushes in the opposite
direction. The moment these outside directors are conceived as
saviors, they will be subject to additional duties that are likely to
scare competent people away.' 2 Thus the law makes it harder to
11. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301 (creating independence requirements for members
of public company audit committees).
12. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 305 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.) (Officer and Director Bars and Penalties); id. at § 1105 (Authority of the
Commission to Prohibit Persons from Serving as Officers or Directors).
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recruit independent directors. Then their duties are so onerous
that they lose their independence. This movement does not
count as progress, but as yet another illustration of the law of
unintended consequences.
The explanation for this change is easy to identify. The
political situation was most propitious for the passage of
Sarbanes-Oxley, for the Bush administration was under heavy
political pressure to "do something" about the corporate
scandals, such as Enron and WorldCom, that occurred in the
previous few years. 13 So its short-term decision is driven by
tactical considerations relevant to the then upcoming off-year
2002 election, without any real consideration to its long term
implications on the structure of capital markets. True to form,
the regulation is defended in part for its prudence, but it
produces more dramatic responses than many had anticipated.
Once the legal rules are put into place, the private parties are
faced with developing internal controls and practices that are
perceived as needed to deal with civil, and perhaps even,
criminal liability. I can recall speaking at meetings of corporate
directors where the anxiety levels were so high that people were
worried whether they could keep their own handwritten notes
without fear of incurring additional risks of liability.
V. THE PREDICTABLE CONSEQUENCES
The uncertainty about the statute has, of course, ramifications
in the international market. The direct costs of compliance are
high, but these do not exhaust the total costs. Firms that are
worried constantly about potential civil and criminal litigation
develop defensive postures. Their boards are less concerned
with innovation and more concerned with compliance. That
mission shift does not go unnoticed by firms that have options to
relocate overseas, so the American capital markets lose two ways.
Some firms decide that it is better to delist on the American
exchanges than to pay the costs of compliance. Others decide
that they will not operate in the United States at all. Still others
decide that they prefer to go private in order to avoid the strain.
Still others decide to avoid or delay going public for the same
reason.
13. Scott Woolley, Feel-Good Justice, FORBES,June 23, 2003, at 52.
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What is going on here? For many years, the United States had
a strong reputation as the home of capital markets. In part, this
was due to the general corruption-free environment. In part, it
was due to weaknesses that existed in overseas markets. There is
little that the United States can do to prevent the improvements
in regulation or financial sophistication by its overseas
competitors. But there is much that it can do to deal with the
situation within its borders. And it hardly helps the situation for
outsiders to doubt that the United States offers a hospitable
regulatory environment, only to discover that they would be well
advised to take sovereign risk as a serious issue. And once
foreign investors anticipate sovereign risk, one rational response
is for them to diversify their holdings away from the risky
sovereign in order to be able to play one sovereign off against
another. Just that perception is enough for U.S. capital markets
to lose their dominant position. 14 These intangible reputation
losses are hard to reverse, especially when other nations turn out
to provide services comparable to our own.
The fear of regulation thus induces other forms of behavior. If
public offerings carry with them serious risks, then firms will
seek ways to minimize those risks. One response is to interpose
new entities between the public and the new offering. Thus
firms that specialize in making private offerings to pension
funds and large insurance companies adopt just this strategy.
The new approach is to strike deals with large entities that
represent many individuals, 1 not dealing with the individuals
themselves. In effect, the private model implements the
approach the SEC should take toward the storied small investor.
The consequences of this shift are hard to evaluate. Perhaps
this strategy, which slights public offerings, would be preferred
in any regulatory environment. But there is some reason to
think that this is not the case. After all, public offerings were
once more common than they are today,' 6 there are some
efficiency losses that follow when the shift is induced by
14. See SOVEREIGN RISK AND FINANCIAL CRISES (Michael Frenkel, Alexander Karmann
& Bert Scholtens eds., Singer Publishing 2004) (discussing diversification as a response
to sovereign risk).
15. See Kasper Meisner Nielsen, Institutional Investors and Private Equity, 12 OXFORD
REV. OF FIN. 185 (2008) (discussing the high degree of invesunent in private equity
markets by hedge funds and other institutional investors).
16. Allyce Bess, Bakers Footwear Makes Imprint on NASDAQ Its First St. Louis-Area IPO in
Two Years, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 6, 2004, at C1.
No. 2
HeinOnline  -- 12 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 423 2007-2008
Texas Review of Law & Politics
regulation and not by market forces. To be sure, diversification
may be preserved in at least some cases, but now two layers of
entities are needed in order to achieve this result instead of one.
The shift thus creates more intrinsic friction and reduces the
level of public disclosure and hence of public awareness. No one
should suppose that unregulated public equity markets will
outperform private equity markets every time, but the moment
regulation changes the relative costs of doing business, collateral
consequences will follow. Koch Industries Inc. will take over
Georgia-Pacific Corp. rather than the other way round, so that
we now have one private company with at a guess $90 billion in
annual sales that issues no disclosure statements at all.17
But what if the firms cannot hide? Now some-it is hard to say
how many-will run for shelter elsewhere. Where? Perhaps to
Hong Kong, London or other places that do not have our
regulatory system. 8 These countries may lack our constitutional
structures, but of what value are these when the level of
protection that the United States affords to property rights is so
diluted that they are always subject to political risks. Our weak
constitutional structure gives us no comparative advantage in
the current round of international competition.
The right structural move now seems clear. Treat "investor
protection" as a double-edged sword, and slow it down. Once
and for all, we must slay the bogeyman that more regulation
means more protection. All too often, we do right by doing less,
not more.
17. Koch Industries, http://www.kochind.com/default.asp (last visited May 20,
2008).
18. See generally COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION (2006), available at
www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee-Interim-ReportREV2.pdf; MCKINSEY &
COMPANY, SUSTAINING NEW YORK' S AND THE US' GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES
LEADERSHIP (2007), available at
www.senate.gov/-schumer/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/special-reports/2007/NYREP
ORT%20_FINAL.pdf (discussing the shift in investment activity from the US to foreign
markets).
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